I. Introduction
In a classic and influential article, Harsanyi probabilities and thus also to the policy (1, 0), which involves randomization only in a degenerate sense.) In spite of the apparent weakness of our axioms, they have strong implications for the representability of social preferences. The sharp result, which is the second essential feature of our theorem, is that the social ordering can be represented by a social welfare function that is a quadratic, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-concave function of individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. Thus we argue that, given suitable Pareto and continuity conditions, the moral view that fairness of the social choice process matters is properly represented (only) by the adoption of a strictly quasi-concave, quadratic social welfare function. Our axioms and theorem are presented in Sections II and III. Then in Section IV, we consider Harsanyi's (1975) cogent arguments that the criticism represented by Diamond's example is untenable since the suggestion that artificial randomization can play a useful moral role in social decision making leads to highly counterintuitive policy prescriptions. This discussion serves both to support our central axiom of a preference for randomization and to clarify the implications of our theorem. Section V presents concluding remarks.
II. Postulates
Following Harsanyi (1955) , let X = {x1, . . ., XM} M-2, denote the set of certain alternatives or social states, where each x E X provides a complete description of the situation of each agent in the economy. One possibility is that X is a subset of some finite-dimensional Euclidean space Er, so that each x E X consists of r numerical components. However, X could be any finite set whatsoever and so could represent situations in which a social state can be described only by infinitely many real components or in which some aspects of a social state are qualitative in nature and defy numerical representation.1 The objects of choice are lotteries with prizes drawn from X. Each lottery corresponds to a probability vector p = (Pl, . . . , PM) that offers xi with probability Pi. The Note that there are grounds for objecting to the hypothesis of expected utility preferences at the individual level. It may be argued that it is the descriptive accuracy, rather than the normative appeal, of the expected utility model that is relevant at the individual level, and recent research (see Machina [1987] for references) has at least cast doubt on the positive validity of the model. In addition, as a theoretical proposition, the expected utility axioms will generally be violated when the lotteries involved are temporal in the sense that some decisions must be made before the lotteries are played out (Mossin 1969; Machina 1984). For example, a draft lottery is temporal, unless it is held at birth, since several life-planning decisions will typically need to be made prior to its resolution. Nevertheless, in order to focus on the primary objective of this paper, we follow the literature on the Harsanyi theorem in hypothesizing expected utility preferences at the individual level and in adopting the "persuasive" appellation "rationality."
Next assume the existence of a social ordering > on L, with > and -denoting strict preference and indifference. The remaining postulates also concern this social ordering. The first has already been mentioned but is restated more formally here. (1 -ot)r > otq + (1 -o)r. Clearly, mixture symmetry is weaker than the independence axiom since, under the latter, ap + (1 -ot)q and (1 -ao)p + otq would both be indifferent to p. In addition, the symmetry axiom has evident intuitive appeal. In the context of the Diamond example described in the Introduction, it requires that a policy in which one randomizes between the vectors (1, 0) and (0, 1) according to the probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 should be indifferent to the policy in which a 2/3_1/3 randomization is conducted. In this case, the appropriate p and q are degenerate lotteries and are mirror images of one another: p delivers the prize (1, 0) with certainty and q delivers the prize (0, 1) with certainty. But neither feature is essential to the appeal of the axiom. If the standard assumptions of consumer theory were also imposed (with convexity of preference strengthened to strict convexity), then, as in our representation theorem below, we could conclude that the consumer's utility function must be (ordinally) quadratic. This would be a troubling conclusion since it rules out many familiar and seemingly sensible utility functions, the constant elasticity of substitution function, for instance. But, of course, "mixture symmetry" in commodity space is much less appealing than in probability space for reasons entirely analogous to those raised in classical discussions of the independence axiom (Samuelson 1952 This axiom is proposed as a means to embody a concern for the ex ante fairness of a choice process. Its interpretation arid appeal are perfectly clear in the context of Diamond's example if p and q are taken to be the degenerate lotteries described above. Note that since it is formulated in terms of strict social preference, the axiom is incompatible with the expected utility form for >, which implies 1/2p + 112q -p. Also note that if everyone in society is indifferent between p and q, then "fairness" is not an issue in choosing between p and q, and it is natural to exclude this case as in the axiom. As a consequence, if all individual preference orderings coincide with the social ordering, then the randomization axiom is satisfied vacuously. However, generally if p and q are socially indifferent, there will be some individuals who strictly prefer p and others who strictly prefer q, and randomization will help to meet competing claims more fairly.
The randomization postulate is discussed further in Section IV, where supporting arguments other than fairness are mentioned. For now, we conclude discussion of the postulates by pointing out that, given continuity and strong Pareto, the conjunction of mixture symmetry and randomization preference is equivalent to the following requirement :3
For each pair of lotteries p and q, if p -q and if p -/-i q for some i, then l/2p + 112q is the unique best lottery among all randomizations of p and q.
Consequently, unless otherwise stated, randomization will refer to an equiprobable one.
III. Representation Theorem
We now discuss the implications of the postulates described above for the social welfare function. Call the function of I variables W a social welfare function (representing >) if, for all lotteries p and q,
where the U-'s are the expected utility functions defined in ( The extension from a linear social welfare function to a quadratic is natural on mathematical grounds. The following theorem, which is the central result of this paper, shows that it is appealing also on ethical grounds. The theorem invokes the postulates described earlier to limit acceptable social welfare functions to the quadratic class (3), thus leaving only the finite number of parameters {aij, bJ} to be specified to reflect further ethical values.
THEOREM Suppose, however, that we assume that the utilities u-are measurable up to ratio scale and are fully comparable; that is, the only transformations of utilities that are admitted are those for which u, -u -au,, where a > 0 is common to all i.4 Call a statement "meaningful" if its validity is unaffected by an admissible transformation of utilities. to the inegalitarian nature of utilitarianism that derives from its exclusive concern with the mean (or sum) of utilities. He argues that the social welfare function should reflect concern also with the dispersion in these utility levels. The functional form above incorporates such concern in a simple way and to an extent measured by the single parameter A. Concern with the dispersion of utilities vanishes only in the utilitarian limit as A ---1 .6 4Sen (1986) describes a number of alternative assumptions regarding the measurability and interpersonal comparability of utility. Such assumptions are common in welfare economics and indeed are necessary in light of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Utilitarianism, in the form of the welfare function W(ul, . . .u, u) = E ui, requires that individual utilities be cardinally measurable and unit comparable; i.e., only transformations ui -au, + bi are admitted.
3 In fact, W' is the most general polynomial of order two on the positive orthant in El that treats agents symmetrically and that is ordinally invariant to any common resealing of individual utilities. Thus it is a natural example to consider.
6 One might be tempted to attach significance to the fact that K is decreasing in the population size I. However, our theorem and the functional form (4) for W relate to a given population of fixed size. If we were to contemplate using (4) to address social choice problems involving variable populations (see Blackorby and Donaldson 1984) , then presumably we would allow A to depend on population size. , p. 38 ). Note the latter argument for randomization, which is distinct from fairnessthe potential of randomization to limit opportunities for corruption and prejudice in social decision making. Another possiblejustification is that randomization enables society to avoid "playing God." This is particularly relevant when questions of life and death are involved, as in deciding who will receive an organ transplant or who will be forced to go off to war. For these and other reasons, lotteries are used in many instances to allocate resources and burdens (Elster 1989 ). Nevertheless, the normative case for randomization in social decision making has been disputed (Harsanyi 1975; Broome 1984b ). Therefore, we devote this section to consideration of some of the more important dissenting arguments, which may be more clearly understood when reexamined from the perspective of our formal framework. The discussion is intended also to clarify the interpretation and implications of our theorem.
Besides the role of randomization, there has been disagreement concerning other issues surrounding the Harsanyi theorem, largely expressed in an exchange between Harsanyi and Sen appearing in Harsanyi (1975 Harsanyi ( , 1977 Harsanyi ( , 1978 and Sen (1976 Sen ( , 1977a Sen ( , 1986 . They include (i) Harsanyi's derivation of social preferences via choice in the "original position" and the implied relation between individual attitudes toward risk and social attitudes toward inequality (see also Sen 1970, pp. 142-43), (ii) the acceptability of a social welfare function that is nonlinear in individual utilities, and (iii) ex ante versus ex post optimality (see also Myerson 1981; Hammond 1983 ). This paper implicitly reveals our positions on these issues. However, since our formal model has nothing special to offer these debates, we shall not mention them further here.
To structure our discussion we identify two (related) questions concerning randomization and address them in turn.
A. How Many Times Should We Randomize?
Suppose that one accepts Diamond's view that it is best in his example to use a coin flip to determine which of A and B receives the good. Then after the random selection is made, presumably the identical motivation would lead us to ignore the result and flip the coin once more. Moreover, this procedure would be repeated forever and a choice would never be made.
This dilemma stems from dynamically inconsistent behavior on the part of the social decision maker. The source of dynamic inconsistency is the assumption that after the first coin flip, the social decision maker would evaluate the choice problem anew, as though the coin had not been flipped at all. But surely the particular procedure leading to a decision node should matter: for example, ex ante, A and B had equal chances of receiving the good; ex post, if A has won, then A and B no longer have equal rights to the good and the argument for randomization fails. If social preferences are dynamically consistent, then after A has won the first coin flip, giving him the good is the socially best alternative.7 We find such dynamic consistency or respect for the process compelling on normative grounds. In addition, its violation would most likely destroy the credibility of the social decision maker. In this subsection we show that our model is compatible with the dynamic consistency of social preference and thus is immune to the criticism of "repeated randomization."
To proceed formally, we are confronted with the difficulty that, strictly speaking, the issue of dynamic consistency cannot be addressed within our formal framework or Harsanyi's; for example, that framework considers only a single preference ordering for society and correspondingly addresses only problems of one-shot social choice. Dynamic consistency is potentially an issue only in dynamic or multistage choice problems in which a number of decisions are made sequentially and the preference orderings that direct choice at each decision node differ suitably from node to node.
However, it is a straightforward matter to suitably extend our for- Next let the first-stage uncertainty be resolved revealing that the event corresponding to the upper branches has occurred, and at the asterisk, before lottery r or s is played out, allow the decision maker to reconsider and possibly choose s. Whether or not that option will be exercised depends on the preference ordering >* that dictates choice at this intermediate stage. The specification of >* is the second critical assumption regarding dynamic preference and choice behavior.
One possibility is to specify that r>*s r s, 
This specification guarantees that the initial choice will not be overturned since atq + (1 -ca)r > aq + (1 -cL)s implies (indeed is equivalent to) r >* s. In particular, in Diamond's example, let a = 1/2, let r and q be the lotteries that produce the respective social states (1, 0) and (0, 1), and let s = '/2r + 'i2q. Then the preference in figure 1 corresponds to the ex ante superiority of the equiprobable randomization to the mixture '/4r + 314q. Under the specification (7), the decision maker will not wish to flip again in the event that the outcome (1, 0) is indicated by the first coin flip. Obviously, the same can be said also in the event of the other first-stage outcome.
For each individual i, we follow a similar procedure: first h-is extended to multistage lotteries via the standard rules for reducing compound lotteries and, second, we use the appropriate form of (7) to define D the preference ordering at the intermediate position. However, the procedure is simpler for individuals than for social preference, since each >i is assumed to satisfy the independence axiom. Consequently, the corresponding forms of (6) and (7) are equivalent and d is independent of the forgone lottery q.
Since social preferences violate the independence axiom, social rankings at * generally depend on alternatives that were possible ex ante but were never realized. In particular, the social weight given to an individual in interim decision making depends on his opportunities ex ante. To see this more concretely, consider the social utility functions V and V* corresponding to > and >*. The relation (7) > Uj(q) => bi < bj. This deviation of weights from equality is needed in order that another flip of the coin be rejected at * or, more generally, in order that the ex ante social choice be carried out there.9 It merits emphasis that the fact that We must be quadratic if W is reflects the "dynamic consistency" of our model; that is, if our postulates are satisfied at the ex ante position, then they are also satisfied at * if (7) is used to update utilities. Put another way, our theorem is perfectly compatible with dynamically consistent preferences for society and individuals, in spite of the fact that social preferences violate the independence axiom. Thus the theorem is immune to attacks, such as Harsanyi's described in the next subsection, that are based on the argument that society will always wish to "flip the coin again." 9 It may help to consider a simple example. There are two people, 1 and 2, and two "goods," health and money. There is one indivisible unit of health, and two units of the perfectly divisible money are available. Each person's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is ui(x, y) = lOx + f (y), where x and y denote i's consumption of health and money and f is strictly concave, with f (O) = O, f (1) = 2, and f (2) = 3. Finally, social welfare has the Cobb-Douglas form W(ul, u2) = ulu2. The ex ante optimal allocation is to flip a fair coin over who will receive the unit of health and to give each person one unit of money. Let * be a point in time after the coin flip when health has been allocated to the winner-person 1, say-but before the money has been distributed. If W is used again at *, then in an attempt to equalize ex post utility, society will give all the money to 2 rather than carry out the original plan of dividing the money equally (10 * 3 > 12 * 2). Society will be dynamically consistent if it updates its social welfare function according to (9), in which case W*(ul, u2) = ulu2 + 12u, + 2u2. This immunity, of course, depends on the adoption of (7), rather than the consequentialist rule (6), for updating social preference. We find the appeal of (7), based on concern with ex ante fairness and respect for the process, to be compelling in the setting of social preference.10 B. Doesn't Nature Randomize for Us?
Harsanyi (1975) rejects the value of lotteries for promoting fairness. We have nothing further to say about his view except that we do not accept it, and, as we try to demonstrate in this paper, it is not necessary for a coherent and sensible model of social choice. Here we focus on a second criticism of Diamond's position that is presented by Harsanyi; namely, that even if randomization were of value, artificial randomization would nevertheless be superfluous given the randomness of individual circumstances produced by "accidents of birth and personal life history." He asks (p. 317): "Why should a bureaucratic lottery be regarded as being a 'fairer' allocative mechanism than the great biological lottery produced by nature?" Harsanyi (pp.
316-18) offers a number of examples to fortify his criticism (see also Broome 1984b, pp. 630-31).
Here we argue that these examples do not diminish the intuitive appeal of our randomization-preference postulate when the latter is properly interpreted. In fact our model is in agreement with Harsanyi about the relative merits of natural and artificial randomization. We differ from him in our view of the desirability of some form of randomization. Our principal point is that randomization between the lotteries p and q is called for by the randomization preference postulate only if p and q are socially indifferent. We offer two remarks relevant to this observation. First, our model is generally agnostic about whether pq. To elaborate, recall the updating rule (8). Given "initial conditions," in the form of a "starting time" to and the welfare weights prevailing then, the weights fai, bi} that apply at any t > to are uniquely determined by the history of intermediate randomizations via repeated application of (8). However, our model is agnostic about the precise specification of to and the associated welfare weights. Consequently, it is agnostic about whether p -q at any given t. Second, even given a specification of the initial conditions, the dynamic consistency of social preference implies that the indifference required by the ran- history, and they can be understood in a similar way. We offer the following final example, a slight variation of our first example. Imagine that medical science has reached the stage at which the process of organ transplantation is a riskless and costless activity. If an individual suffers an organ failure, one possibility for society is to let that individual bear the burden of the failure, either through enduring the resulting disability or death or through waiting for a donor organ (which we assume to be scarce). But in the state of technological advance described above, it would also be possible to randomly select a person in society who will be forced to exchange the specific organ with the initially afflicted individual. One could adopt an ex ante perspective and view the first policy as the choice to accept life's randomization, whereas the second policy insists on additional artificial randomization. With a utilitarian social welfare function, randomization of any sort between indifferent alternatives is a matter of indifference. In particular, society would be indifferent between these two policies. However, given our model of social choice and the ex ante perspective, once life's randomization has occurred, individuals no longer have equal "rights" to healthy organs. Thus, in contrast to the utilitarian prescription but in conformity with intuition, the additional artificial randomization reduces social welfare and the policy of accepting life's randomization is strictly preferable.
V. Concluding Remarks
For the reasons represented by Diamond's example, we are unconvinced by Harsanyi's argument in support of a linear social welfare function. At an "operational" level, a concern for ex ante fairness can be incorporated into social decision making by adopting any social welfare function that is strictly quasi-concave in individual utilities. The contribution of this paper is to propose and justify axiomatically a specific alternative to Harsanyi's additive form: the strictly quasiconcave, quadratic functional form for social welfare. Given our axiom of randomization preference, which leads to the strict quasi concavity of the social welfare function, our justification for the further restriction to quadratic functions is based primarily on the intuitively appealing axiom of mixture symmetry. Randomization has played a prominent role in our analysis and discussions but, as we now clarify in concluding, not to the extent that a superficial reading of the paper might suggest. Our motivating examples involved indivisible goods in which generally some ex post inequality is unavoidable but ex ante equality may be achievable by means of randomization. In such circumstances, randomization (natural or artificial) may be part of an optimal social choice, and we defended such policies against Harsanyi's criticisms. However, the axiomatic justification for a quadratic social welfare function is valid and intuitively appealing even in environments in which social optimality is achievable without any randomization. For example, interpret X as the feasible set of social states and suppose that the utility possibility set D0 {(ul (x), . . ., u1(x)): x E X} C E' is a convex set, for example, as in a standard private-goods exchange economy setting in which individual utility functions are concave (risk averse). Then the set of feasible utility allocations is not enlarged by admitting lotteries over social states (i.e., the set D defined following [2] coincides with D0), and hence nontrivial randomization over social states is unnecessary for social optimality. In that sense, preference orderings only on X, rather than L, need be of concern. Nevertheless, it is still sensible to hypothesize that social and individual preference orderings are defined for all lotteries, that is, on L, and that they satisfy reasonable conditions there. Our axioms lose none of their appeal when viewed from this slightly different perspective, and the conclusion that social welfare must be quadratic remains intact. 
